Impatient Yanks and Cautious Brits: A Rift between Friends
The United States' entry into the war following Pearl Harbor was a pivotal event in the prelude to Operation Overlord. While Britain feared that the U.S. would regard the struggle with Japan as taking precedence over a campaign in Europe, the exact opposite was true. As early as December 1941, Roosevelt and his chiefs of staff were adamant to pursue a "Germany first" strategy. Nazi occupation of the continent was viewed as a far more pressing concern than the war in the Pacific. All felt confident that as soon as Germany surrendered, Japan would capitulate.
At the ARCADIA conference on 31 December 1941, an immensely relieved Churchill took heart from hearing that Germany was everyone's first priority. At this same conference, the United States committed itself to Bolero, the extensive buildup of American forces in Britain. In fact, during the coming months, the United States rather than Britain began to press for an early cross-channel mission to reclaim Europe from the Germans.
While the United States was highly impatient, Britain was extremely cautious--a combination that was bound to cause a rift between friends. One key point of debate throughout 1942 and part of 1943 was that the United States pressed strongly to set a specific date for the invasion, while Britain favored a more flexible approach that did not entail setting a specific date.
Originally, the United States' point of view stemmed from a fear of the rapid collapse of Russia, unless a diversion was created in Europe. Predictably, Stalin was also urging the opening of a second front. Thus, under strong coercion, Churchill agreed in principle to an invasion no later than April 1943.
Britain, however, insisted on also preparing for an invasion of French North Africa. In the summer of 1942, the United States reluctantly assented.
In August of that same summer, the Allies decided to stage a kind of rehearsal for the future large scale invasion. The plan, code-named Operation Jubilee, called for raiding the French port of Dieppe. Tragically, the poorly planned operation was completely unsuccessful. Of the 5,100 troops who landed, 3,648 failed to return.
The tragedy of Dieppe was demoralizing, and pointed out the extreme difficulty of waging a cross-channel invasion. The desert campaign was not yielding decisive results and the Bolero buildup in Britain was proceeding slowly. Because of these circumstances, it became clear to both Britain and the United States that there could be no invasion of Europe in 1943.
Finally, at the TRIDENT conference held in Washington D.C. in May 1943, the target date of 1 May 1944 was set for the Allied landing in Europe. It was at this conference that the Allied assault was code-named Operation Overlord.
Some months later, however, Britain still felt powerful reservations about the planned operations. Having experienced years of war and severe casualties, the prospect of a blood bath that would surely result from confronting the German army in France was painful to contemplate. This sentiment is reflected in this quotation from a letter sent to Roosevelt by Churchill on 23 October 1943:
"My dear friend, this is much the greatest thing we have ever attempted . . . . I pray God it does not cost us dear." (1)
By near the end of 1943, emotions still ran high. At the TEHERAN conference in November 1943, the first joint meeting of the Big Three (Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin), Operation Overload was hotly debated. During one terse exchange, Roosevelt sat quietly while Stalin questioned whether the British really believed in Overlord or only said so to reassure the Soviet Union.
The confrontation proved fruitful. On November 30, Britain recommitted to the launching of Overload in the coming May. Though the operation was later delayed by one month, the TEHERAN conference represented the turning point in the debate between the Allies.
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1. Max Hastings, "Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy," (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 22.
